C-SPAN/NEWSMAKERS

Host: Steve Scully

Guest: Michael Turner, Congressman, Ohio-R, Member of the House Armed Services Committee

Reporters: John Donnelly, James Kitfield

STEVE SCULLY, HOST, C-SPAN NEWSMAKERS: Joining us on Newsmakers on this Sunday is Congressman Michael Turner, Republican of Ohio and a Member of the House Armed Services Committee. And here for the questioning, John Donnelly, Defense and Foreign Policy Reporter for CQPolitics.com, and James Kitfield of the National Journal.

Congressman, let me begin by referring to what the president said last Thursday when he made the announcement. He said that the new approach would be swifter, smarter, and more aggressive in going after threats around the world. Your reaction?

CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL TURNER, OHIO, REPUBLICAN: Well, I wish any portion of that was true, actually. The plan that he’s scrapping that would have been a European land-based system, would have provided both Europe and the United States with short-medium, intermediate, and long-range. And the most important aspect of this would be the long-range ICBM protection. It would have been able to respond if Iran, for example – which would be ICBM at the, especially the United States.

The – that system was scheduled to go on line as early as 2013. That was the scheduled deployment time period. There was some concern as to whether or not that was the appropriate configuration because there were other systems that are currently in play that you know perhaps in a different configuration could have made a difference.

In an independent assessment that our subcommittee just had presented to us earlier this year showed that this was the most cost effective system. Of all the other systems that we have in play or in place, this would have been the most cost effective.

Now, the other aspect is time; again, this system having been slated for availability as early as 2013. The White House, in their own communication, indicates that their plan – which is currently a very undefined plan as to what the system that they’ll put in place will be – won’t even be available until 2020.

So sitting here in 2009, having the President of the United States saying that he is going to choose a different plan that’s available 2020 for a threat that I believe is absolutely imminent and scrapped a plan that would have been available 2013, it certainly is very curious.

SCULLY: So why the change? Why the change in policy?

TURNER: I think the president has been toying with trying to send a signal to Russia that he wants to start a new relationship. You know there were reports earlier in the year that he had sent a letter to Russia perhaps even offering up scrapping the system in exchange for Russia coming to the table to assist in Iran’s pursuit of its nuclear program.

Now there has been no indication that Russia has any indication of doing that. In fact, the indications have been in the opposite. As – and Russia has been asked to support sanctions or stand against Iranian continued march toward having a nuclear program for its advanced munica (ph) program. Russia has not been a voice of deterrence or trying to hold back Iran’s ambitions.

So the president had signaled that perhaps he wanted to start a relationship with Russia and placing that on the table would be helpful perhaps in starting negotiations. Russia had expressly stated that they wanted the president to concede on this missile defense shield that would have been targeted for being based in Europe as part of the start negotiations, having the president concede this before we enter into strategic negotiations of our nuclear weapon systems.

The trouble with that is historically there has never been a point where concessions to the Russians in negotiations has ever resulted in any advancement of concessions on their part. So it’s an odd strategy to take, but I think that’s the only one that we’re left with.

SCULLY: We’ll go to John Donnelly at CQ Politics.

JOHN DONNELLY, DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY REPORTER, CQ POLITICS: OK. I want to ask you about the issue of the timeline on the missile defense system because in fairness to the administration, they argue that they are deploying a system that will be able to intercept short and medium range Iranian missiles, which the current system wouldn’t, and they’d be able to deploy that shorter range system sooner than under the previous plan starting in 2011.

So isn’t – isn’t it important to give them credit for getting something in the field sooner in response to what they say are the more pressing threats from Iran?

TURNER: Well, no, not necessarily because if you look at their communication, they go on to say we’re going to address short and medium by 2015, intermediate by 2018, and ICBMs by 2020. This system available in 2013 would have taken care of medium, intermediate, and long-range. For short range, we obviously have other systems and short ranges are a different issue as to the fact of looking at European defense and of course intercontinental ballistic missiles and U.S. defense.

So I wouldn’t trade short for long range. I don’t think I would ever say, well, congratulations, administration. You’re going to achieve something by 2011. And in exchange for that, you’re going to move protection of the United States from 2013 to 2020, which is on their own Web site their timeline that they’ve published.

JAMES KITFIELD, STAFF CORRESPONDENT, NATIONAL JOURNAL: Hasn’t Secretary Gates said new intelligence suggests that Iran will not have a long-range capability by 2013 and that they have the short and medium capability now, so it’s important to get something into the field to you know protect our European allies from that and then move towards the ICBM capability, as you said, in 2020?

TURNER: No, no. I never suggested anything in 2020. But see now, that’s a false choice. To say that we can’t do two things at once would suggest that you know if we have a threat that’s growing that responding to this means that we have to put at risk the continental United States, and I just don’t believe that’s the case.

KITFIELD: Now how does that put us at risk then if…

TURNER: Because the system that would have gone in place in Europe that the president has scrapped would have been available by 2013, and they would have provided ICBM protection to the continental United States from this European site. The president’s own Web site description does not identify ICBM protection as being available as part of his plan until 2020.

KITFIELD: And Secretary Gates says there’s new intelligence that they won’t have the ICBM capability for some number of years beyond 2013.

TURNER: Well, no one has the intelligence that he is supposedly citing. All the intelligence that we have – I’m the Ranking Member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee Armed Services, everyone in Armed Services has access to the same information – has indicated that their intercontinental capability is going to be 2015, meaning that the president’s plan would arrive five years after Iran has reached ICBM capability.

But the other issue is we’re talking about 11 years for the president to say – with Secretary Gates – that I have new information and that they’re 11 years away from an ICBM capability when we all know that everyone who’s sitting at home in their chairs watching television know who’ve watched CNN and FOX News and C-SPAN, that, that Iran has launched a satellite into orbit. This is the type of capability that translates into ICBM capability.

And also the other issue is this – they are working in concert with North Korea and others and certainly could acquire and have advancements in their systems that then we will not be able to respond to.

DONNELLY: Reportedly then the dates for the new intelligence estimate – and it’s a May 2009 classified National Intelligence estimate on the Iranian missile threat - are that it is likely to emerge after 2015 but by 2020. So that’s the Iranian piece of it.

But my question for you concerns the United States’ ability now to defend against an Iranian attack. General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that we currently have the ability from the Alaska and California sites to defend against an Iranian launch anywhere in the United States, he said, and from any point of launch in Iran.

I checked with the Pentagon today and they said that that is correct, that they have the capability now and that the European, the Poland/Czech site, would have made it a little bit – a little bit stronger capability but that we still have it now. How do you respond to that?

TURNER: That’s an excellent argument, but there are real three important issues that we have to address in trying to grapple with that. The first is the argument of well, we’ll just shoot from Alaska. We don’t have to shoot from Europe. Or we can handle that just intuitively among ourselves.

If you and I both have packages to send to Iran, and I’m going to send mine from Europe and you’re going to send yours from Alaska, I think we could all agree that I’m more likely to get there before you do. And that certainly was the system that he just scrapped.

The second thing is that the president just cut missile defense by $1.2 billion and just eliminated a third of the missile field in Alaska. There were 30 missiles that were scheduled to go up there. The president proposed a $1.2 billion cut while this administration is on a spending spree in every other category. While we have North Korea advancing toward missile technology, ICBM capability – and you know Korea already has nuclear capability – while we have Iran marching to nuclear capability, and making it clear that they want to seek ICBM capability, this administration this year cut missile defense by $1.2 billion and a third of the cut was missiles to that.

The next thing is – there’s three items I said we had to address for this. One of course is I’d rather shoot from Europe than Alaska if I’m going toward Iran. The second is this administration this year cut a third of Alaska’s capabilities. And third is if you have Europe and you have Alaska, you have both, you have a second shot. You don’t have a second shot if you’re shooting from Alaska. If you shoot from Alaska and you’re unsuccessful, where do you take a second shot from?

DONNELLY: OK. I think the administration would say that yes, even if you can get it there faster from Europe than Alaska, you could still get it from Alaska. They clearly say that.

Secondly, the number of interceptors may not be as many as they had planned, but Secretary Gates says it’s sufficient. And so how would you respond to those points?

TURNER: A lot of these are buts. They’re yes buts, yes buts, yes buts. We can still do this, we can still do this, we consider this. But why would we ever choose less? I mean, that’s what this whole discussion is about, right? It’s about we have technology. We’re the United States. United States has always had an innovated spirit and a commitment to our own defense. If we have the capability, we reach for it and we try to ensure that our freedoms and liberties are protected.

And in this instance, we have this administration cutting right now missile defense by $1.2 billion while everybody sitting at home knows that North Korea and Iran are the biggest news and the biggest threat to the United States that’s emerging.

Two – hold on a second because this is an important list, I think.

KITFIELD: OK.

TURNER: And secondly, you have the issue of cutting current capability and inventory, and then thirdly you have the issue of eliminating whole systems. If Iran decides to send an ICBM to the United States with a nuclear capability, I’m going to want to have everything in my disposal because we’re talking about the United States being attacked. And that’s something that we need to defend vigorously.

KITFIELD: We have a Secretary of Defense who’s a lifelong Republican. He was President Bush’s Secretary of Defense. He actually proposed the system that he’s now substituting another system for. He has the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen on board. He has all the Joint Chiefs on board. And I’ve just been listening today to NATO allies seem to think this is probably a better way to go, too.

Why would all these people be behind it if it, as you describe, puts us at such a vulnerable position?

TURNER: Well, I mean, this is – this is fairly easy to discuss. I mean, the first thing is you know NATO endorsed this system and you said this secretary proposed it. It is not speculative for us and in comparing the two scenarios to look at the gaps.

We know the administration has said 2020. We know that the administration has said – and Secretary Gates has said – the other system is available 2013. That’s seven years. We know that the Intell says it could be 2015 for Iranian ICBM capability and you know perhaps nuclear capability.

But they’re still at 2020. It’s a five-year gap from where the projections are that Iran would have ICBM, perhaps nuclear, capability, seven-year capability gap from the plan that he scrapped. It’s not more cost effective. There’s an independent study that was done of all the systems which include the system that the president’s proposing of using more inter-strips (ph) and the like, which says that this was the most cost effective.

So they say not – they don’t disagree with the things that I’ve just said to you. All of those are their own numbers. They say that the risk is acceptable. And I don’t agree with them.

DONNELLY: But the one thing you’re leaving out – if I may interrupt – is that the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the Missile Defense Agency say we have the capability today to intercept an Iranian missile if it were launched at the United States. So you don’t trust them on that point?

TURNER: There are systems that are in place that can assist us. But they’re certainly not to the level that everyone would like or the president wouldn’t be proposing a new system. I mean, think about what you just said. You said we can already do it.

Well, if what we had already was sufficient, the president wouldn’t be scrapping this system and proposing a new one. He’d say we’re already there. We’re not there.

DONNELLY: We’re proposing a new system that will evolve starting with shorter range systems eventually to a strategic long-range defense.

TURNER: In 2020. And no one, no one, contradicts the 2020. That’s their own figure, 2020. And the system he scrapped was 2013, seven years. The difference between us is he believes that seven years is a risk that he’s willing to take. And I don’t believe it’s the type of risk that we take as the United States.

KITFIELD: Talk for a second about Russia. You said that this was primarily an attempt by President Obama to improve the relationship with Russia. A lot of Republicans – including George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and others – had said that that’s an absolutely critical thing to do because the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world is our number one threat. And to get at that proliferation we have to have more support from Russia on Iran – as you mentioned – but also reducing our own arsenals to convince other countries that we’re serious about reducing this threat.

So wasn’t getting that relationship back on some sort of a workable position important for the Obama administration?

TURNER: Well, that’s absolutely true. And I agree with that wholeheartedly. Getting the Russian relationship strengthened, ensuring that we have a successful start negotiation and concluded is important. Having Russia for the first time agree with us that Iranian advancements in the nuclear area and in the missile area is something that should be addressed through sanctions and be diminished would be wonderful.

I don’t agree that the way to do it is by lessening the defense systems of the United States, and I’d be surprised if others agree that by lessening the systems that it’s the right way to go. We need to get them at the table, but not this way.

And let’s just digress for a second and take the Russian/United States discussion on missile defense and break that down to find out what we’ve done. Russia says they don’t like our missile defense system. It’s a missile defense system. It’s not an offensive system; it’s a defensive system.

For Russia to say I don’t like your defensive system is saying that they want their offensive systems to be more successful, more effective. I don’t think we should ever go to the table and have someone ask us for concessions on our defensive systems.

In this instance you can loosely translate what Russia is saying is I want you to put your missile defense shield down because I might want to bomb. And because of that, that is an unreasonable request to begin with and it’s one we ought not (INAUDIBLE).

KITFIELD: This system, as everyone knows, is absolutely useless against the Russian arsenal. It could overwhelm easily.

TURNER: So you’ve given an excellent argument why we should not have been conceding to them. Why would they be asking?

KITFIELD: No, I’m not going to you know take the Russian’s point of view, but it did drive them crazy to have – the fact that we would have large interceptors and they said they feared would be – at some point could be armed with nuclear warheads right next door where they had very little warning. I’m not saying that’s the right thing.

TURNER: Well, they have 3000 tactical nuclear weapons right there. I don’t buy that they have – and here’s the point that I think is the most important. I don’t buy that they have a reasonable basis to be asking for a concession for us in a defensive system. Therefore I don’t buy that it’s a concession that we should have made or that was worthwhile to make.

KITFIELD: And if Russia put in large interceptors in Cuba, for instance, that they said were a defensive shield, we wouldn’t have a problem with that? Well, that is as close to us. I think we – we’ve been through that, haven’t we?

TURNER: Cuba’s a different issue, obviously, than Europe.

KITFIELD: But I’m saying we are putting – we are putting these interceptors in their backyard. I mean, if we – I think if the shoe was on the other foot you have to say, well would you feel threatened at all if Russia was putting in large interceptors someplace in our own neighborhood, our own backyard? Because that is what we’re doing.

TURNER: Are you arguing against NATO? I mean, because it’s a NATO system. It’s a NATO-endorsed system. It’s not a U.S. solely advanced system. NATO endorsed it. It’s part of – and it’s to be part – of an integrated NATO system.

I mean, if you’re saying that we shouldn’t do it because it’s in Russia’s backyard then you’re considering we shouldn’t be there and perhaps NATO shouldn’t be there.

KITFIELD: No. I’m not saying that at all. I’m trying to get at why we might want to if we have bigger fish to fry with Russia, for instance, on strategic arm reductions and on Iran. We might want to concede them a point. I think that’s what the Obama Administration is actually doing. You don’t agree that’s what they’re doing?

TURNER: Well, no. And here’s my points. One, I don’t believe that even if the bill (ph) is laudable for increased relationships with Russia and bringing them to the table in a way that’s meaningful and it shows that we want to bring them to the table, I don’t believe that defensive systems are the way to do it.

Secondly, I don’t believe – even if the president believes defensive systems should be on the table – that the risk of moving from 2013 to 2020, the U.S. capability for ICBM protection for Iran is worth it. That’s a risk I would not have taken.

SCULLY: But based on what Secretary Gates said last week, couldn’t better relations with Russia lead possibly to better relations with Iran or a less of a threat from Iran in the next 5 to 10 years?

TURNER: Well, that’s an interesting point. And it’s an interesting point because, you know one, Russia has not shown any interest in playing that role. They have not stepped forward at all and given us any indication that they either would be effective in reducing Iran’s thirst for intercontinental ballistic missiles or missiles which hits (ph) the nuclear system…

SCULLY: (INAUDIBLE)

TURNER: …exactly. Or that even if Russia was interested that Iran would be – would respond. Iran’s not indicated that they would be dissuaded by Russian intervention.

And here’s the third thing that’s important, though. A real, I think, dynamic thing happened at the same day the president made this announcement. The same day that this announcement occurred, the International Atomic Energy Agency made an announcement in Vienna that they believe Iran has already got the capability to be a nuclear power, that they already have the ability to make a nuclear weapon.

And that release is sort of a game changer because if your goal is to dissuade Iran from having that capability and the agency is issuing their press release saying that they already have it, what are expecting at this point then to get from the Russians?

DONNELLY: The key issue is their ability to deliver that weapon, right? And so the question is that what is their timeline for ICBM development on their side? And then the separate question is what is our capability today to defend against that? And it sounds like you just don’t accept the word from the joint staff that they have that capability today to intercept the Iranian missile if it – whenever it becomes capable of launching toward the United States.

TURNER: Well, actually what I’m saying to you is that they’re not speaking as absolutely as you are. I mean, if they believe that they had everything that they need to counter an ICBM threat from Iran, the president wouldn’t be proposing an alternate system to the one he scrapped. They’d say we’re already there. But they haven’t said that.

Now there are capabilities that we have. But they’re certainly not the type of capabilities that everyone wants to say we’re done, including the president and the joint chiefs. They are proposing an alternative system. They’re saying it will be available 2020; the one they scrapped would have been available 2013. And the difference I think is an unacceptable time period.

DONNELLY: They’re looking to improve the system they have in Alaska and California. But they stated unequivocally in testimony and today to me in an e-mail that they have the capability today to defend against an Iranian missile (INAUDIBLE).

TURNER: They are not trying to improve the capability they have in Alaska. They cut it by a third.

DONNELLY: (INAUDIBLE) to augment it with the European installation.

TURNER: The interceptors in Alaska, this administration this year cut missile defense by $1.2 billion. Nearly a third of the capability in Alaska – that was slated to be in Alaska – is going away. So for them to say to you we can rely on Alaska when they’re diminishing its plan capability by a third, imagine where we were. We were – where you had said that the joint chiefs are probably saying we have the capability that can currently respond – we were expanding Alaska’s capabilities, and we were placing this capability in Europe.

So we have three shots, if you will, plus we have the technology innovation as it’s progressing in the time period. This is 2013. And what have they done? They’ve taken Alaska, diminished it by a third. They’ve taken Europe off the table until 2020, and they’ve said, but that’s OK, we’ve got this and we’ve got what will be left in Alaska. And that is not sufficient I don’t believe.

KITFIELD: Just to be clear – and this is a very technical subject – the – as I read that release, it said that it had the nuclear material possibly to make a bomb, not that they were weaponizing or mastered the weaponization of that material. Our own CIA has said that Iran got out of that since 2003, unless I’ve missed some intelligence.

TURNER: I have the AP NewsBreak. Nuke agency says Iran can make bomb. And now (ph) this material is Vienna. Experts at the world’s top atomic watchdog are in agreement that Tehran has the ability to make a nuclear bomb and is on the way to developing a missile system able to carry an atomic warhead, according to a secret report seen by The Associated Press.

So you know we’re all just going on what The Associated Press said. But they don’t just say material. They say the ability to make a bomb. And that came on the same day the president said I’m unimpressed with their progress on delivery, and I’m willing to let the United States be exposed for additional seven years while I deliver a different system on 2020.

KITFIELD: Did he say that? I’m willing to let the United States be exposed? Is that a quote?

TURNER: When he says 2020 and the other system was 2013, that’s what he’s saying, absolutely. It is a difference between 2013 and 2020.

SCULLY: We have about two minutes left. One final one (ph).

KITFIELD: Just – (INAUDIBLE) – maybe the AP reporter is not that experienced, but now (ph) having done this story and talked to them many times, I’m pretty sure they’re not saying they’d weaponized. But that information, we’ve had (ph) intelligence usually comes from us.

TURNER: I believe that they’re saying capability. And capability means that they have the ability. And here’s the issue that I think we all have to be more concerned about. There are no absolutes in any of this.

I mean, when you say 2015 and 20 you know maybe by 2020 they’ll have it and do they have it weaponized or do they not have it weaponized, this is what we know. Iran has a program that they are actively seeking the ability to have a nuclear bomb, that they are actively seeking missile technology for delivery, and that they are on a path that we can’t really predict with absoluteness what their timeframe is going to be of success.

We do know that some in our intelligence believe it’s going to be as early as 2015. We do know that the system that we would have deployed in Europe would have been available 2013, ahead of the earliest time period that our intelligence says they might have it, which they still could beat 2015.

We do know straight from the White House’s Web site that the first time that the system that they’re proposing would be available for ICBM capability, responding to ICBM, is 2020. But that’s not up for debate.

DONNELLY: Once again you left out another thing we do know which is that the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in testimony of the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the current system has the capability to intercept Iranian ICBMs.

So we’re not – it may not be the ideal system, but according to them – according to the Pentagon – is a system that is capable today.

TURNER: Which, as I said in response, if they thought that was sufficient, if they thought that was all we needed and scrapping the European system, they wouldn’t be proposing another. They’re not saying we’re there yet. Yes, we have capability, but even they believe in what the president is proposing they need additional capability. I just disagree with them because I think the one they scrapped was the one we needed.

SCULLY: How big of a threat is Iran to the U.S.?

TURNER: I think Iran is a great threat. I mean, you have a country that has repeatedly had instances where you know people are from their own military are singing, chanting death to America. I tend to believe that when we have an adversary that we should believe them, that you know we shouldn’t just say, oh, that’s for show, they don’t really mean this, that if that’s what they’re saying and we know that they’re you know seeking this weapon system, they’re seeking missile systems, we need to defend ourselves. That’s what America has always done best, and I think we need to do it now.

KITFIELD: I don’t think it’s any argument – and there’s no argument here, I’m sure – that Iran represents a threat. The question is as long as zero sum game in this, there’s only so much money to go around, you can’t do everything. And they’ve made a choice. And you know, I take your point that some people are going to be uneasy about this, but apparently the joint chiefs are comfortable with it.

TURNER: Well, this is an administration that apparently thinks we should spend overwhelmingly in all areas but the military. To cut it this time missile defense by $1.2 billion and then to go in and to cut this European system I believe is irresponsible, especially when this administration continues to propose new spending but looks for savings and something that puts our country at risk. I just don’t think it’s right.

SCULLY: Congressman Michael Turner, Republican of Ohio, Member of the House Armed Services Committee, thanks for being with us.

TURNER: Thank you.

SCULLY: We continue the conversation with John Donnelly of CQPolitics.com and James Kitfield of the National Journal. Open-ended question to both of you, what was behind the president’s decision last week?

DONNELLY: Well, they won’t acknowledge it openly, but I do think that there was a big view toward Russia in that decision, an attempt to hopefully bring Russia closer to helping out with the Iranian nuclear missile problem primarily, among other issues.

But I do – I do take them at their word that it was a reprioritizing of the way the system is going to be configured to deal with a threat that is more immediate in the short immediate range missiles with a technology that is more proven on the U.S. side and then down the road moving toward a longer-range capability in Europe.

But I also – you have to take them at their word that the system we have in Alaska and California is at least to some degree capable of intercepting an Iranian ICBM if it had been launched at the United States.

KITFIELD: Yes, I think that’s right. I mean, they won’t say that because it looks like they’re just some – they want a quid pro quo with Russia. But he – this – he went to Moscow last summer in July and said he wants to reset that relationship.

Well, this system that they announced without NATO’s approval. They announced that this was going to be the system in Poland and Czech Republic – the Bush Administration all on their own – and it just kind of really got under Russia’s skin. So you had to sort of weigh you know how much advancement you think you can make with Russia on strategic nuclear arms reductions on pressuring Iran versus it was – it was a non-starter for Russia to seriously negotiate that with the system being constructed in what it considers its backyard.

We should remember that the Republicans are much more wedded to the idea of missile defense ever since Ronald Reagan got up and gave the Star Wars speech. They have been extreme – it’s been a part of every Republican plank since then. Democrats are a little bit more skeptical about its utility, about how much it costs, about how effective it will be.

In this case, I think he kind of – he kind of got – found the common middle ground. And what tells me he found a middle ground is he got a Republican secretary of defense and all the joint chiefs to agree on that. These are not people who are known to accept unacceptable risks for the country lightly. They take that very seriously. So that tells me that there’s probably a middle ground here that will be successful in selling this.

SCULLY: Which was something that Congressman Turner pointed out that this administration increasing funding for everything except defense programs.

DONNELLY: Yes, not quite accurate because defense has done quite well. There was in increase in the defense budget this year. It’s not what the Bush Administration had wanted it to be upon leaving, but they have increased it. And the defense budget has soared since 9/11, so it’s not like they’re starving over there.

KITFIELD: And what you notice about this is, again, going back to the joint chiefs, either – what a lot of people don’t know is the uniformed military is a lot less passionate about strategic national missile defense than a lot of people assume. This is actually shows that inclination of theirs.

Theater (ph) defense they know how to do. They do it well. It’s much better – it’s much – these systems that we’re talking about now have been tested more, have been more successful, so they’re more robust. And they want to build up from the theater (ph) up to the strategic level. The Bush Administration with national missile defense was building down from a strategic level you know back to the theater (ph).

And so it’s not really surprising that a Democratic president went this way. And like I said, if it gets this much buy-in from the military suggests to me that he’s found a middle ground that’s kind of a sweet spot between those who would like to just scrap it altogether on the left side of the Democratic Party and those Republicans who would rather build missile defense than do almost anything else.

SCULLY: And quickly, how is this playing both in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe?

DONNELLY: Well, I think that it’s – there’s not a monolithic response from Poland and Czech Republic. There’s people who hate it and there’s people who did not like the idea of deploying this system in their countries. So it’s – there are divisions there.

KITFIELD: Yes, I mean this – clearly Poland and Czech Republic wanted to build this system because it gets American troops on their soil. That makes them feel a lot safer with the big bad bear next door. So there’s some disappointment.

The public wasn’t really behind these in those countries, but the political elite (ph) were. In Western Europe there’s a lot – I think they’re breathing a sigh of relief because the really bad trajectory of U.S.-Russian relations that we saw that culminated with the war in Georgia last summer was making a lot of the Europeans very, very nervous.

SCULLY: James Kitfield, whose byline appears in the National Journal, and John Donnelly writing for CQPolitics.com. Gentlemen, thanks for being with us on Newsmakers.

KITFIELD: My pleasure.

DONNELLY: Thank you.

END